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The communist system in China – inspirations
from the past
On October 1, 1949, on the Tiananmen place, communist leader Mao Zedong pro-
claimed establishing the People’s Republic of China. That fact was a critical change in
the hitherto authority system in the State of the Middle. The victory of communists in
the civil war resulted in the necessity of introducing a new social and political order.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it was formed, to much extent, basing on already-
-well-known forms from the past. Many solutions applied in China after 1949 had their
prototypes much earlier. In author’s opinion, the times of Republic of China and the
People’s Republic of China did not break this long chain of history. In case of this
country, historical continuousness from the most ancient times up till the contemporary
ones can be consider. What can be observed, are constant referrings to the antecedents.
On the other hand, one should note that in China such referrings have never been ar-
ticulated directly. The two zones, of what has and what has not been verbally ex-
pressed, are of equal importance. Hence, allusions or reticences can often be found in
Chinese tradition. François Jullien (2006) drew attention on osmosis of two areas, one
of direct expressions and the other, bringing “polemical substrate,” i.e. of what is ex-
pressed directly and indirectly (Jullien, 2006). As he wrote: “the concept of allusion
assumes two aspects: the importance of what has been said in comparison to what has
not been said, as well as significance of link between them both” (Jullien, 2006,
p. 258). Leonid Vasilyev (1974) drew attention to strong links with tradition, under-
lining that “an important feature of Chinese system of dogmas, standards and traditions
was not only the constant and very significant orientation on the past (that once used to
be treated as an unequalled benchmark), but also creating, within ages, such forms of
social and political organizations that provided optimal conditions for continuation of
that system in an almost unchanged form” (Vasilyev, 1974, p. 443). However, he no-
ticed that Chinese culture together with all ideas and institutions was subjected to
a process of changes and development. New solutions were breaking through very
slowly, being created in confrontation with traditional models. They rather used to fail
than win. But what is important is the fact that by making even a little influence on
separate spheres of life, the modern solutions constituted some way of perfecting and
evolving traditions themselves. Hence, Vasilyev seems to be very much true when
saying that “the dogma triumphed, the supremacy of tradition was total, but both the
dogmas and traditions were changing as the time passed by” (Vasilyev, 1974). Joseph
Needham (1984) underlined the meaning of precedence and convention in the context
of considering Chinese authorities’ performances. Thus, one can say that the state has
always been ruled by the Confucians party (Needham, 1984).
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According to determinants of Confucians ideology, the government in the state of
the Middle was a prolongation of the family. Relations, fixed in micro-scale, were
naturally translated onto higher levels of social integration. There is a strict correlation
between the structure of the family and the structure of the state. A precisely defined
range of laws and duties can be found there. Social roles are unambiguously differenti-
ated. Obedience and duty constitute the basic determinants of Confucians thinking. As
Confucius (Kongzi, Master Kong, 551–479 BC) used to say: “It is needed for the em-
peror to behave as the emperor shall, for the minister – as the minister shall, for the
father – as the father shall, and for the son – as the son shall” (Confucius, 1976,
p. 121). As every member of the family should subject to the will of the father, the
senior of the family, thus, all the citizens shall obey the decisions of the highest
authorities. In the opinion of Lin Yutang (2003), the Chinese society is organized bas-
ing on the family system (Lin Yutang, 2003). In such approach, people constitute the
basic goals for which the state exists and performs. Hence, the state can be called a
common endeavor, within which all the citizens share the results of their works. The
world is perfect, people have to tend to keep it in such balance. All the citizens, prop-
erly fulfilling their duties, contribute to harmonic and proper development of the state
and the society. People are not equal upon the laws of nature, hence, various links and
subsidence relations exist. Each individual, possessing a special role to be performed,
fulfills his duty towards the society in which he or she exists. Collectivism significantly
dominates over individualism. The society is a sum of individuals, co-operating with
each other and contributing to the growth of country’s power. In China, a strong affec-
tion to tradition and culture lead to forming a specific scheme of world perception.
According to the accepted theory, this was China that constituted the middle of the
world. That resulted in a characteristic feeling of supremacy over foreigners. This is
not accidental that the own name of the state is Zhongguo, meaning the State of the
Middle. The mentality of the contemporary Chinamen has not changed very much in
this area.
Confucianism, being not a religion but rather an ethic-moral system, has actually
taken religion’s place in Chinese conditions. In Gu Hongming’s (2004) opinion, Con-
fucius has transferred the true idea of state to the Chinese people. Hence, the public
zone, the widely-considered area of social and political life, were given an almost re-
ligious justification. Here, one can conclude that a religion of state or religion of soci-
ety are present in China (Gu Hongming, 2004).
Besides Confucianism, the philosophy of legists (fajia) was also developing in the
ancient China. It had its days in the period of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC). The main
goal of the legists was to create a strong, centralized state. The necessity of working
out proper system of legal regulations was constantly mentioned, providing emperor’s
law to make any amendments or corrections into it. The legists suggested implement-
ing a system of awards and punishments. The mechanism based on legists’ ideas lead
to growth of spying and society’s invigilation, moreover killing any expressions of
individual freedom. Many solutions from that period were later on adapted by commu-
nist authorities in Mao’s times. Mao Zedong sometimes identified himself with the
establisher of Chinese empire, Qin Shihuangdi (Garnet, 1973).
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Within 20th century, referrings to the antecedents took place many times. Norms,
previously stated among the society or unwritten traditions, determined, to much ex-
tent, performances of state leaders. Simultaneously, these were the rules that decided
on legitimization of the highest authorities. Here, it is worth to recall the opinion of
Max Weber, who specified three types of authority’s legitimization: charismatic (de-
riving from citizens’ conviction on particular predispositions of the ruler, allowing him
to be in authority), traditionalistic (deriving from conviction that old institutions are the
best ones), and rationalist or legal (basing on conviction that the authority depends on
stated legal order, focused on aims accepted by citizens) (Szostak, 1997). On the other
hand, David Beetham indicated three areas to consider the concept of state government
legitimization. Legitimization of the authority can be considered when it has been ob-
tained and is conducted according to the accepted rules. Besides, rules of the authority
need to find justification in convictions of parties linked by ruling relations. An active
acceptance of citizens for ruling dependencies is assumed (Beetham, 1995). In the
opinion of Władysław Szostak (1997), it is also important within the context of the
discussed process to justify the performed rulings, i.e. to provide the basis of its per-
formance (Szostak, 1997). The above described considerations can be easily referred to
Chinese reality. In the empire period, the basis of state government legitimization was
the Mandate of Heavens (tianming). The emperor ruled by the approval of Heavens,
performing as an intermediary between the Earth and the cosmic zone. Nevertheless,
this mandate was not given forever. An emperor, performing his duties in a wrong way,
might have been derived of his authority. Hence, the justification for revolution ap-
pears in Chinese tradition. The people were given a strong right to overturn a bad ruler
who had started to consider only his own interest, without attention to the common
wealth. In China, a particularly important role is connected with unwritten norms, indi-
cating behavior of authorities and common citizens. A characteristic feature of Chinese
political system was strong and charismatic leadership. The ruler represented a defined
set of features, allowing him to be in authority. For sure, such role was played in the
previous century by Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.
In China, after the empire broke down, no new traditions were created without
finding justifications or even equivalents in the past. Obviously, it is hard to omit some
inspirations from outside. But, however, it should be underlined that the phenomenon
of “merging” was rather of selective character, i.e. adopting only some foreign solu-
tions with maintaining domestic traditions. Foreign solutions played rather supporting
role in relation to what could have been observed in China for ages.
Only in this context, the appearance of communist party on Chinese political scene
should be considered. Since the very beginning, this movement worked out its own
path; copying of foreign benchmarks did not take place. Marxist and Leninist rules got
“sinized.” In China, communist system of clearly national character was developing,
taking into account the specific of this huge country. It should be underlined that in-
formation possessed by the leaders of the newly-established party about Marxism were
very selective. Firstly, anarchism was popular among these societies, particularly
works of Piotr A. Kropotkin and Mikhail A. Bakunin. Mao Zedong himself, only in the
second decade of 20th century, working in magazines’ library in Beijing, met the
works of Marx and Lenin. Mao constructed his knowledge about socialism basing on
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only three books – The Communist Manifest, History of Socialism by Kirkup and Kaut-
sky’s The Struggle of Classes (Terril, 2001). Leszek Kołakowski (2003) in his work
Main streams of Marxism wrote that Mao “was in that time a nationalist and democrat
of unclear socialist tendencies, but not a Marxist” (Kołakowski 2003, p. 581). Hence, it
is hard to consider imitating patterns from Moscow or other socialist countries. Obvi-
ously, referrings to Bolshevik revolution took place, well presented by works of prof.
Li Dazhao (1918), who often referred to this issue and the phenomenon of communism
itself in the press. In the article The Victory of Bolshevism he underlined that defeating
the Germans in the war had been a triumph of humanitarianism and pacifism, right-
eousness and freedom, democracy and socialism. Simultaneously, it had been a tri-
umph of Bolshevism and the global working class. Li belonged to the group of strong-
est supporters of idea of transplanting Russian experiences into Chinese ground (Li
Dazhao, 1918). The Chinese Communist Party, in the first years of its existence, should
be called as a narrow couple of intellectuals; members of this couple were clustered in
small discuss groups. On the establishing congress, held on the turn of June and July
1921 in Shanghai, only thirteen Chinese delegates and two representatives of Commu-
nist International were present. Communism in China was formed basing on the previ-
ous mass protests of the people, New Culture Movement and The May Fourth 1919
Movement, of clearly patriotic character, but simultaneously expressing protest against
performances of Beijing authorities, aggressive policy of Japan and other Western
powers in the area of the State of the Middle. In the same time, a rapid development of
Chinese academic centers took place. Many activists of this time, particularly from the
left part of The May Fourth 1919 Movement, joined the communist party later on. That
fact made an important influence on the established party, characterized by such ele-
ments as strong nationalism, demur against foreigners, frequent referrings to domestic
past. Domestic experiences were opposed to the Western culture. In this context, Chi-
nese communists found their own path, different from the vision propagated by the
Soviet Union and the Komintern. This derived not only from the feeling of difference,
possessing own, different consciousness, but also from the specific character of the
state. China is mostly an agricultural country. The Chinese Communist Party was
based mostly on peasants. An outstanding American sinologist, John King Fairbank,
underlined that “economical base of China was generally an agricultural one, and,
hence, the Chinese revolution had to be of much more agricultural character than the
Soviet one. The peasants were to be the main revolutionists. The final feature deciding
on ‘sinization’ of Marxism was the overwhelming proud of country’s history and cul-
ture, meaning that China cannot be ‘a tail of any dog.’ In the effect, the Chinese people
were only ready to accept Chinese Marxism” (Fairbank, 1996, p. 299). Workers did not
play a bigger role in the Chinese Communist Party. This was undoubtedly a character-
istic element in comparison to membership structure of other communist parties in the
world, based on proletariat. In 1920s, the Chinese proletariat was only ca. 2 million
persons, making only 0.5% of total Chinese population of that time.1 Additionally, it
                                                
1 J. Chesnaux gives that in 1920, proletariat in China made ca. 1.5 million persons, out of whom 40%
worked in foreign-owned companies (Chesnaux, 1969). J. Guillermaz, on the other hand, defined the total
number of proletarians at the beginning of 1920s at the level of 2 million persons (Guillermaz, 1968).
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has to be noticed that the masses were very much dispersed, what undoubtedly made
a big influence on processes connected with mutual coordination and organization of
activities. Hence, these were the peasants who became the main engine of the revolu-
tion, although the meaning of worker-peasants’ alliance was underlined in official
propaganda, paying special respect to the role of the army. These three groups became
kinds of party’s backbone. It is worth mentioning that for a long time, by the beginning
of 1950s, the idea of creating a “common front” of representatives of various classes
was propagated.
Communism in China was formed not only in confrontation with the Nationalist
Party (Guomindang), but also in struggle against Japanese aggressor. This was the
conducted partisan struggle that created rules, directly indicating inspirations from the
past. Mao Zedong, defining main military assumptions, recalled Sunzi (1997), the
author of The Art of War.2 The ancient thinker indicated few elements, important from
the point of view of military strategy. What becomes important is defining own and
enemy’s potential. The victory is to be obtained by the smallest possible own losses.
Hence, reconnaissance not only among enemy troops, but also in the terrain becomes
so important. By obtaining enemy’s plans, one can prepare himself properly. From this
point of view, the necessity of destroying his alliances has to be considered. Under-
standing oneself is not less important than recognizing the enemy. The fight is to be
taken up only in case of sureness of triumph. In uncertain situation, one should restrain
himself, applying defensive. One should fight in conditions providing big chances of
winning. Sunzi refused fighting in situation of uncertainty or big hazard. Nevertheless,
he suggested applying techniques of manipulation, possessing efficient military intelli-
gence, introducing chaos into enemy’s troops. Diversion actions are focused on win-
ning enemy’s troops for own ones. Enemy’s weaknesses need to be used and the weak-
est sides – attacked. The attack should be well organized, as time of action plays the
most important role to make the victory. Sunzi drew very big attention to actions in
hard terrain, and, particularly, to proper recognition (Sunzi, 1997). Be recalling Sunzi’s
works, one can easily note that communist troops conducted this scheme very pre-
cisely. Mao Zedong used also many solutions applied in the first half of 19th century
by Taiping army. Referring to Sunzi’s ideas, struggles with Guomindang and Japan
were conducted. Mao understood the necessity of constant military activity, applying
the strategy of long-term war (Mao Zedong, 1953). Counterattack could have been
taken up only in certain conditions. For these needs, active help of local population for
communist troops was necessary, as well as good starting positions, full concentration
of own main forces, finding enemy’s weak points, his physical and moral tiredness, as
well as his wrong moves (Mao Zedong, 1953). Patient waiting for good conditions to
attack and taking advantage of all enemy’s military mistakes lead to guaranteeing
military success. Simultaneously, there was sense in “forcing the enemy to make mis-
takes,” by using what Sunzi called “creating appearances” (Mao Zedong, 1953, p. 296).
                                                
2 Sunzi lived probably in 6th age BC, in the Springs and Autumns period (772–481 BC). He is identified
as the author of The Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa), or at least its basic part. Later on, the text was reedited and
filled few times. The tractate is assumed as the oldest one in the world, describing precisely the rules of carry-
ing out struggles. In 2nd age BC, a well-known historian Sima Qian wrote the biography of master Sunzi.
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Basing on Sunzi’s work, eight political and four tactical rules of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party were worked out. They regarded the following issues: 1. Hang up all your
doors when you leave the house (doors in China were used by soldiers as beds – note
Otto Braun); 2. Bind the mats and give them back; 3. Be friendly and kindly towards
the citizens and help them if you can; 4. Give back whatever you have borrowed; 5.
Repair whatever you have damaged; 6. Be fair by any transactions with peasants; 7.
Pay for everything you buy; 8. Stay clean and keep the latrines in safe distance from
houses. Tactical rules, on the other hand, concerned the following issues: 1. When the
enemy goes forward, we withdraw; 2. When the enemy stops and organizes a camp, we
bother him; 3. When the enemy wants to avoid fighting, we attack; 4. When the enemy
withdraws, we chase him (Braun, 1976, p. 101). Partisan struggle in mountain regions
was conducted basing on the main thesis, i.e.: “The rule of maintaining own forces and
destroying enemy forces establishes the basis of war craft” (Mao Zedong, 1956, pp.
112–113). Sunzi’s concepts to much extend defined the conditions of Chinese Com-
munist Party functioning also after 1949. These guidelines became also, by Confucians
rules, the basic indicator of political view of the contemporary China.
Chinese communists formed a system prepared to conditions of their own country,
diametrically different from the Soviet pattern. In 1930s, Moscow laid too much trust
in the group of “twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” Chinese communist activists educated in the
Soviet Union. This group functioned, however, without touch to what was going on in
China. It consisted more of theoreticians than practicians, proposing implementation of
solutions having not too much to do with the situation. Unlike them, the “domestic”
communists had been formed in the country and provided concrete solutions. Moreo-
ver, they were able to interpret correctly social moods and diagnose the current situa-
tion. After finishing the Long March in mid-1930s, the Chinese Communist Party
made significant shifts within the applied methods of performance. That was the time
when the USSR and Komintern finally lost their possibility of forming communism in
China. Protégés of Moscow found themselves in defensive. The Komintern liaison
officer by the Chinese Communist Party in Yan’an, Piotr Władimirow (1977), clearly
recognized the sources of Mao’s supremacy over the group of “twenty-eight Bolshe-
viks:” “The source of Mao’s force is not only that he does not hesitate to use any hooks
in this struggle, but also in very good knowledge of psychics of Chinese peasants and
little bourgeois, national traditions, what cannot be said about members of ‘Moscow
group,’ who are purely theoreticians, although truly devoted to revolution. Mao’s
demagogy concerns national features and, thus, it is so flexible, well-masked and much
more enhancing. Mao uses national feelings, being under foreign oppression, simulta-
neously taking advantage of Marxism – Leninism popularity in his speculations”
(Władimirow, 1977, pp. 142–143). Chinese communists used wording characteristic
for Marxists and Leninists ideology in a very instrumental way. Chinese communist
party links with international communist movement were relatively weak. Communism
was given mostly national character. Hence, it often recalled to what was common, i.e.
own experiences grounded mostly while struggling with foreign influences. That was
the basic difference between the USSR and China. Referrings to many sources were
made. The society gathered around ideas filled with different sense. It was not possible
to cut off the entire past. What unified various communist activists were common ex-
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periences. Ross Terrill wrote that “Mao was deriving Marxism of its European origin,
providing it with Chinese birth certificate” (Terrill, 2001, p. 230). Mao Zedong draw
attention to the role of experience, locating it in the centre of cognizance. Hence, the
cognizance took the place of object that was to be cognized: “What is necessary for
direct cognizance of any phenomenon or phenomena, is the personal participation in
struggle tending to change the reality, any phenomenon or phenomena, as because only
such participation can lead to meeting the external side of any phenomenon or phe-
nomena and only such practical participation lets us find and understand the essence of
any phenomenon or phenomena” (Mao Zedong, 1953, p. 403). Further on, he wrote:
“If you want to cognize the taste of a pear, you need to change it – take it up and beat.
If you want to cognize the construction and features of an atom, you have to carry out
proper physical and chemical experiments, change the condition of the atom. If you
want to know the theories and methods of revolution, you need to participate in revo-
lution. The entire real knowledge derives from actual experience” (Mao Zedong, 1953,
pp. 403–404). Mao underlined the link between cognizance and practice by recalling an
old Chinese proverb: “You cannot catch tiger kitties without entering tiger’s lair” (Mao
Zedong, 1953, p. 404).
A good proof for instrumental usage of links with international communist move-
ment was the position of Mao Zedong himself. On the 6th Plenum of Chinese Commu-
nist Party Central Committee in 1938, he claimed: “Marxism should be given national
form before it becomes applied. There is no such concept like abstractive Marxism, the
is only concrete one. What we call concrete Marxism, is a Marxism that was given
a national form... ‘Sinization’ of Marxism, as it shall be called, means that in all its
expression, it [Marxism] derives from Chinese specific, is applied together with these
characteristic features, becomes a problem that the entire party shall understand and
solve immediately” (Rumiancev, 1974, pp. 34–35). This thesis was often recalled by
him further on. During the Chinese Communist Party Political Bureau seating in 1943,
he maintained his position, by arguing that Marxism-Leninism is needed by China, but
it shall be adjusted to national, purely Chinese needs and conditions. Particularly im-
portant here were the words that “there is a need for constant and consistent struggle
for truly national and independent character of the Chinese Communist Party” (Władi-
mirow, 1977, pp. 146–147).
For communism in China, the spiritual commonwealth of the citizens of the country
turned out to be more important than Marxist ideology. The quintessence of this idea
was the sentence of Mao himself, spoken during the last meeting with Piotr Władimi-
row: “what is needed to rule China is not the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. What
is most important is the knowledge of China, its needs, traditions...” (Władimirow,
1977, p. 272).
After establishing the People’s Republic of China, some efforts were made to
ground the new quality. Part of this idea was implementing a ban against organizing
tributes to Confucius. Situation of other cultural or religious traditions looked similarly
(Zwoliński, 2007). In the hottest period of “cultural revolution,” common campaigns
organized to destroy the “four olds” (regarding culture, ideas, traditions, behaviors)
brought some kind of breakdown. This can be compared to what was happening in the
time of Qin dynasty rulings, when books of political essences and chronics were burnt,
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while, simultaneously, books concerning “healing, medicines, telling fortunes from
turtle shell and from yarrow, as well as sowing plants and growing trees” survived (Sy-
ma Ts’ien, 2000, p. 61). The will of building a new system made the emperor destroy
everything except the Qin empire writings. Any recalls to the past, oppositions against
the contemporary times, were subjected to capital punishment together with the entire
family (Sy-ma Ts’ien, 2000). Mao, like the ancient emperor, tended to implement and
ground the cult of his own person. In the Qin Shihuangdi times, actions were taken to
unify the thinking by implementing proper “severe house morality” (Garnet, 1973).
The model of acting in Mao’s times seems to be almost a copy of that pattern. It is also
worth to remind the propaganda campaign against Confucius, initiated in 1970s and
tending most of all to defeat political enemies of the leader and reconstruct Mao’s po-
sition, weakened by previous events. It can be said that tending to create a new model
of a human being, grown and formed by socialism, did not reach its final goal. In the
time of “cultural revolution,” a total break with the past did not take place. Things that
happened after Mao’s death in 1976 are a proof of that. Already at the beginning of
1980s, one could have easily observe the first symptoms of regeneration of ancient
ideas, kind of renaissance of Confucius thinking. That derives to much extent from the
fact that, in author’s opinion, Maoism itself included many more purely Chinese ele-
ments than patterns characteristic for Marxism-Leninism. In Chinese conditions, one
could have observed the birth of Confucianism in a communist version.
When Deng Xiaoping and his collaborators initiated the policy of reforms and
“opening towards the world,” China entered a new stage of its history. Within the last
three decades, main guidelines have been worked out, indicating the bases of Chinese
political system. Representatives of the ruling class assumed building their own model
of democracy. An American politologist of Polish origin, Zbigniew Brzeziński (1990),
drew attention to the fact that “unlike the case of organic rejection in Eastern Europe,
communism in China stands before perspective of being constantly included among the
values and traditions of this country” (Brzeziński, 1990, p. 157). Such idea is supported
by changes that took place in the recent years. Retiring of politicians from the first and
second generation and replacing them by younger ones lead to significant quality
change.3 Starting from 1982, cadres of old revolutionists were gradually replaced by
a group of well-educated technocrats, mostly engineers.
Initiation of the process of reforms lead to forming various conceptions concerning
state development. In Hong Yung Lee’s (1991) opinion, in 1980s, four groups were
formed within the frames of the party. The first one was identified with Hu Yaobang,
for whom political changes were to become the first step towards further economical
reforms. Hu himself rejected the Marxist-Leninist system as not compatible with Chi-
nese circumstances. Simultaneously, he called upon implementing democratic rules
inside the party. The second group, connected with Zhao Ziyang, presented a similar
scheme of thinking, supporting continuation of economical reforms. In the third group,
                                                
3 The first generation in the Chinese Communist Party were party activists who joined it before the be-
ginning of the Long March (1934–1935). The second generation consisted of Anti-Japanese war veterans.
The third generation covered politicians born in 1920s and 1930s. The youngest generations of politicians,
the so called forth generation, are party members born in 1940s and later on.
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there were party activists closely connected with Deng Xiaoping. It should be noted
that, on one hand, this group presented quite pragmatic approach to economic issues,
but, on the other, was characterized by tough position in political questions. A consis-
tent group of conservative activists gathered around Chen Yun. They negated Maoist
methods of population mobilization for economic development, but simultaneously
they propagated maintaining at least the basic structure of national planning (Hong
Yung Lee, 1991). Despite taking up reforms in economic area, not very much changed
in political matters. At the end of March 1979, Four Basic Rules were proclaimed,
indicating that China should follow socialist path, obey the proletariat rulings, party
leadership and Marxism-Leninism. These writings clearly indicated that despite liber-
alization in many areas, the issue of leadership is not a subject for discusses. This is the
Chinese Communist Party that shall remain the only force in the state.
By this occasion, a strong connection with the previous period was underlined.
A proof for that was the position of the party towards the late leader Mao Zedong, ex-
pressed by 6th Plenum of 11th cadency of Chinese Communist Party Central Commit-
tee in the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the
Founding of the People’s Republic of China of June 27th 1981. Contesting Mao’s
achievements might have meant hitting the very bases of the system, as he was the
symbol of both the revolution and national heritage. Leader’s achievements in revolu-
tion struggle in the first years after creating the People’s Republic of China were un-
derlined. Nonetheless, his performance in the Great Leap Forward and “cultural revo-
lution” periods were assessed negatively” (Beijing Review, no. 27, July 6, 1981). An
important element of referring to the past was the issue connected with rehabilitation of
victims of the past period. The campaign, lasting for few years, covered few dozens
million of people. Many outstanding leaders of the party were rehabilitated posthu-
mously. Building of a new system, considering the newly appearing challenges, was
started up without breaking links with the past. The main area on which public should
focus became the economic development. At the end of 1970s, the conception of Four
Modernizations was assumed, covering the most important economical spheres of the
country, i.e. agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology. It is worth
mentioning that ideological or political reforms were not mentioned there. The growing
democratic movement in China met total disaster, finalized tragically on Tiananmen
place on June 4, 1989.
The communist party had to pass through redefinition in the area of applied meth-
ods, searching for new bases of authority legitimization. For that reason, the rule of
posts’ division was implemented. An important move was the policy of gradual rejuve-
nating party cadres. Campaign for education of new cadres was started. Data, provided
by “Renmin Ribao” in March 1985 indicated that only 4% of the current
42-million-members-big Chinese Communist Party possessed high education, 13.8%
were graduates of secondary schools, 42.2% of preliminary schools, while 10.1% were
analphabets (Ladany, 1988). Slowly, the party was supplied by a group of young people.4
                                                
4 After the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, People Daily published data concerning the
age structure at the end of 1981. The party gathered 39 million of members. 6.8% of them joined the party
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Transformation in China was to be managed by the ruling party. In his elaboration
in October 1987, the General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (1988) defined the guidelines of
what is commonly known as socialism with Chinese specific: “Socialism of character-
istic Chinese features means joining of universal rules of Marxism with the issue of
modernization of China” (Zhao Ziyang, 1988, p. 54). Zhao speeches, indicating various
differences of Chinese reality, made a visible deflection from classical Marxism:
“Building socialism in such great state of the East as China, is a novum in the history of
Marxism development. Situation which we face is not equal to what was assumed by
creators of Marxism, i.e. building socialism basing on highly developed capitalism, but
also differs from the one met by other socialist states. One can neither mechanically
implement book formulas nor copy foreign experience. Necessarily, one has to con-
sider the actual conditions of our state as the starting point, join universal regularities
of Marxism with Chinese reality, and, in practice activity, promote the way of building
socialism of Chinese characteristic features. In this area, our party possesses important
considerations and valuable achievements. Simultaneously, it has passed through many
failures for which it had to pay a high price” (Zhao Ziyang, 1988, p. 10). The priorities
became economic development, struggling with poverty, industrialization and mod-
ernization of the state as well as technological progress. The communist party was to
play the role of system’s securer. The confirmation of the newly chosen way was im-
plementation, by the General Chinese Congress of Peoples’ Representatives in March
1993, an amendment, changing the wording of art. 15 of the constitution of 1982.
Then, the term of “socialistic market economy” appeared, replacing the old definition
of planned economy. Simultaneously, statements concerning national enterprises
obliged to meet requirements defined by the plan, were cancelled (Wang, 2002).
Within the conditions of Chinese state, adopting rules characteristic for market econo-
mies took place. But what is typical, is filling the term with the word “socialistic,”
tending to indicate clearly the vision of forming the economic development. To this
vision one should also add strong recalling to elements of Confucius tradition. Indi-
viduals co-operating with each other become the force pushing forward the national
economy. It is worth mentioning that in China since the end of 1970s, one can observe
changes in the area of social behaviors. Lu Le drew attention to four significant elements
that appeared together with changes in socio-economic zone, i.e. transferring from ethic
economics into economical ethics; replacing renzhi, i.e. administrating by personal
authority; popularization of rules typical for sciences in various kinds of economic ac-
tivities; adopting Confucian’s guidelines to rules of market economy (Lu Le, 2003).
In September 1997, the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in
Beijing, approved building socialism with Chinese specific in the area of conducted
economical changes and actions connected with privatization of national companies.
An important resolution of this congress was acceptance to various kinds of ownership
in the economy. On that time, the president of the state, Jiang Zemin, started promoting
the idea of “spiritual civilization,” that was to stand against moral and ethical decline
and social chaos that might have appeared in the period of economic transformation.
                                                
before 1949, 38.6% between 1949 and 1966, 40.6% in the years 1966–1976, the rest 14% after the end of
“cultural revolution”, in the years 1976–1981 (Ladany, 1988).
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For that purpose, Jiang suggested taking up actions tending to educate patriotism,
commonwealth, socialism and dynamic “social morality, work ethics and family vir-
tues” (Wang, 2002, pp. 57–58).
It can be noted that the strategy of performance of the communist party significantly
evolves. Searching for new sources of legitimization of its authority, it visibly looks for
instruments providing the sureness of success. On the other hand, focusing the society
on common endeavors and targets leads to strengthening the state. In this context, im-
portant efforts were made by the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
November 2002. That was the time when the government authorities informed that
their goal becomes building a national model of democracy that would consider local
realities and specific. Hence, the idea of reflecting Western solutions was rejected.
What turned out to be important from the point of view of building social integrity, was
the opening towards private entrepreneurs. That fact was reflected in the accepted con-
ception of “Three Representations,” lanced since late 1990s by president Jiang Zemin
(People Daily, November 18, 2002). This statement constituted a significant deflection
from the hitherto ideology, underlining the supremacy of workers-peasants’ alliance.
Such vision was not changed by Jiang’s words, underlining that workers, peasants and
soldiers still established the “backbone of the party” (People Daily, November 18,
2002). Position of private entrepreneurs within the party was significantly strengthened
as a result of implementing proper statements in party’s status and in the constitution.
In March 2004, the General Chinese Congress of Peoples’ Representatives approved
the amendments to the constitution, concerning protection over private ownership and
respect to human rights.
Economic development remains the main area on which the public is focused. Eco-
nomic indicators show that China becomes one of the biggest players on the global
scene. In the period since 1978, i.e. the moment of starting up reforms managed by
Deng Xiaoping, up till 2006, the Chinese economy noted average yearly growth of ca.
9.6%. In the same period, the gross national product grew up from USD 216.5 billion
up to USD 2.6 trillion (China Daily, November 6, 2007). Moreover, it is worth men-
tioning that in the recent years, China notes big surpluses in foreign trade. The surplus
for 2006 made USD 177.47 billion, meaning a 74% increase in comparison to the pre-
vious year, when the surplus made USD 102 billion (Puls Biznesu, January 10, 2007).
These indicators show clearly that within the coming decades, China are to join the
group of the biggest economic powers of the world. It can be said that internal condi-
tionings will make a positive influence on development policy. Nonetheless, it should
be stated that in the meanwhile, various problems connected with this process will
appear. Good examples can be the growing differences in development of various re-
gions of the country, citizens incomes, lack of qualified employees with simultaneous
growth of low-qualified labor, growing unemployment, problems connected with natu-
ral environment protection, issues connected with health care, etc. There are many
more such crucial areas and, thus, one has to keep them in mind when considering
development perspectives of China.
The communist party, being the only meaning political force in the state, faces big
challenges. It is worth mentioning that the moves of the recent years tended to ground
its position among the public. Only one Chinaman per twenty is a member of this or-
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ganization. At the end of 2006, the Chinese Communist Party gathered 72.391 millions
of members (People Daily, July 11, 2007). But what is worth mentioning, is the sig-
nificant opening towards new societies, previously not considered in party’s policy.
Besides the mentioned business environment, a big success of the authorities was en-
hancing young people and women.5 The party evolves and the ideology is significantly
pushed into the background. Well-educated technocrats, considering market assump-
tions, get the voice. That fact became already fully visible during the 15th Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party in 1997. Than, the entire permanent committee of the
Central Committee consisted of technocrats. Moreover, among 24 members of the
Political Bureau, 18 can be defined in such way. Since that moment, this new leader
team started to call itself a “nubile technocratic leadership” (Wong, Yongnian Zheng,
2002, p. 92). The last decade shows that the authorities transfer their centre of interest;
new authorities do not use the old rhetoric. No one discusses the struggle of classes.
The truth challenge becomes grounding the position, maintaining the existing system,
reinforcing its elements. A continuously evolving mechanism is observed. It can be
easily seen that the local authorities still search for legitimization of their position.
A proof for this might be the speech of president Hu Jintao on August 31, 2007, under-
lining the necessity of developing education all over the country. In his opinion, this is
the area that should become the leading one to educate more specialists and build prop-
erly functioning society as well as support the further modernization of the state (Peo-
ple Daily, August 31, 2007). The official idea promoted by Hu became “building
a harmonic society.” Together with growing potential of the state, the standard of liv-
ing of its citizens keeps growing as well (China Daily, September 29, 2007).
In China, we can observe building a system adjusted to the local conditionings;
some elements coming from the West are transformed accordingly to the local culture
and tradition. This should also be the way of considering possibility of adopting de-
mocracy in the Western mode onto Chinese ground. Democracy – in the opinion of
Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao – “is a value pursued by all mankind and a fruit of
civilization created by mankind. However, in different historical stages and different
countries, democracy is achieved through different forms and in different ways” (The
Times, September 6, 2006). Development of citizens’ society is carried out under con-
trol of the communist party. In China, monopole of government is observed. Any ex-
pressions of activity contrasting with the accepted political line of the party are sub-
jected to severe punishments. A good example might have been the activity of Falun-
gong sect, gathering more members in 1990s that the communist party. From the point
of view of the authorities, each such behavior became the source of anxiety and im-
plementing social chaos. It can be said that fear of chaos or disturbing social balance
always defined the behavior of rulers of the State of the Middle in crises situations.
Chinamen, living for ages in constant contact with foreigners, adopted many concepts
taken from outside. But it has to be remembered that they grounded them in their local
way. A kind of source can become Taiwan. Reunification of the island with the conti-
                                                
5 At the end of 2006, the Chinese Communist Party gathered 16.919 million people below 35 (0.4%
increase in comparison to the previous year). On the other hand, number of women in the analogical period
grew up at 0.5%, making 14.292 million (19.7% of the entire cadres) (People Daily, July 11, 2007).
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nent can become a significant impulse on the way to political changes in China. Any-
way, there is no doubt that democracy in Chinese version would not be a copy of pat-
terns well-known in western states. What can be rather observed in China is adapting
the term which is then filled by different essence. Strong connection to Chinese or
Asian values results in forming system of ruling in the State of the Middle presenting
more domestic than foreign features. Tending to understand this, one should search in
ancient history, giving answers to most of the questions about the form and future of
the rulings in China.
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